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Thank you for the chance to address you today.  It is a sobering taskto address the issue of nuclear disarmament in one of the two placeson Earth to have felt the terrible power of nuclear energy used in
war, but I am grateful for the chance to offer some thoughts on this subject.
As I emphasized at a United Nations conference in Sapporo earlier this
week, it is very important to devote serious attention to realistic and
practical thinking about how we can create the conditions that would
allow the achievement of total nuclear disarmament.  Supporters of
disarmament must work to ensure that they can provide persuasive answers
to hard-nosed skeptics who contend that disarmament is a naïve dream –
or worse, a dangerous delusion.  I find it encouraging that there seems to
be increasing interest in undertaking serious study of the very challenging
questions that arise when one considers how to make total nuclear
disarmament a realistic and plausible policy option in the real world.
The United States has, on multiple occasions, offered its thoughts
on the kind of international security environment it would be necessary
to create for total nuclear disarmament to become practical and realistic.
If you are not familiar with this work, I would encourage you to become
so: our papers and comments are available on the “NPT Review Cycle”
website of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation at
the U.S. State Department.1  We do not intend these positions to be
definitive statements for all time on such issues, but we do hope that
they will serve as the beginning of an ongoing dialogue, as the
international community works to think through some of these questions.
* Remarks to the Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues Nagasaki,
Japan (31 August 2007)
1 See http://www.state.gov/t/isn/wmd/nnp/c21893.htm for the various papers and
remarks currently available.
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Today, I would like to offer a some thoughts on one of the thorniest
challenges that advocates of disarmament face: ensuring that a future
world that has taken what Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev once
briefly considered as the so-called “zero option” remains reliably at
“zero” over time.  This is a formidable challenge, for logic suggests that
as the number of nuclear weapons decreases, the “marginal utility” of a
nuclear weapon as an instrument of military power increases.  At the
extreme, which it is precisely disarmament’s hope to create, the strategic
utility of even one or two nuclear weapons would be huge.  As we sit
here today in Nagasaki, of all places, one needs little reminder that a
country that possesses the only nuclear weapons in the world sits in a
position of extraordinary power.  This is a sobering fact with which
advocates of disarmament must wrestle, because it means that the very
achievement of total nuclear disarmament could greatly increase the
incentives for nuclear proliferation.  It is therefore vital for any zero-
option regime to be able to provide rock-solid assurances that it will be
able to deter – and, if necessary, respond to – attempts to achieve
“breakout” from a disarmament regime by suddenly beginning to produce
nuclear weapons and thereby seize strategic advantage.
This is the challenge I would like to discuss today, for I think that
too little serious attention has so far been paid to this problem.  Most
discussions that I have heard about a zero-option world seek to answer
this question – when, indeed, they do at all – simply by declaring that
the U.N. Security Council needs to be reformed and empowered to
enable it to take swift and effective action against a country that attempts
to subvert the disarmament regime.  An effective Security Council, I
believe, must indeed be part of the solution if the “zero option” is to be
taken seriously, but I am afraid that without a good deal more, this will
not be sufficient to address the task at hand.
Specifically, solutions that posit a rapid and reliable Security Council
as a sort of deus ex machina that will step in, where needed, to solve
disarmament’s “breakout” problems smack too much of a medicinal cure
that presumes the disease already to be in remission.  A world in which
the permanent and rotating members of the Council will agree swiftly
on action to deter and respond to any “breakout” attempt – and in which
all governments will be ready and willing quickly to translate Security
Council requirements and exhortations into effective concrete steps
toward these ends – already would be one in which such dramatic steps
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were less necessary than they are in the untidy world of today.  To put it
brutally, if the international community were harmonious enough to be
capable of acting together so rapidly, reliably, and effectively in a
multilateral forum such as the Security Council, there would probably
be less need for the Council to act in the first place.  In a world which
has not been fully purged of ambiguity, complexity, and contestation, a
credible “zero-option” regime must be able to provide some assurances
against breakout that do not presuppose both a swift and resolute
international consensus against any suspected violator and an unwavering
willingness to bear the burdens of decisive response.
More is probably needed.  Friends of disarmament must be able to
articulate a broader vision of deterrence within the context of a zero-
option world, a vision which does not depend exclusively upon
international consensus to ride to the rescue when problems arise.  In
our discussions of these matters, the U.S. Government has offered some
tentative thoughts on this subject, which I would like briefly to outline
for you.
We have spoken repeatedly of the importance of developing non-
nuclear means of strategic deterrence.  This is today an important focus
of U.S. strategic policy.  Since our 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, we
have been working diligently to develop and improve means of
accomplishing strategic deterrent goals that no longer – as in years past
– rely exclusively upon nuclear weaponry.  Today, we are developing a
“New Triad” of nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems, defensive
measures, and improved industrial infrastructure, intelligence, and
command-and-control architectures that is reducing our reliance upon
the traditional Cold War “Triad” of land-based missiles, bombers, and
missile-carrying submarines.  The critical element for the purposes of
our discussions today, of course, is that of non-nuclear deterrent means:
we seek better ways to accomplish, without nuclear weapons, strategic
deterrent missions that previously could only be achieved with such
weapons.
This thrust is of obvious importance to the process of achieving
nuclear disarmament, but it also has implications for stability in a non-
nuclear-weapons world.   Such improved capabilities, after all, not only
speak to how to make nuclear weapons seem less necessary, but also
can help provide an answer to the challenge of how to convince a would-
be violator that attempting “breakout” from a zero-option regime would
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be very much against its interests.  Post-nuclear deterrent capabilities,
in other words, could make nuclear weapons seem both less necessary
for today’s possessors and less attractive for those who might consider
them tomorrow.
We also have spoken of the link between disarmament stability and
the development and improvement of ballistic missile defenses and other
means of defeating WMD delivery.  Such capabilities can, I believe,
powerfully contribute to stability in a zero-option world in two ways.
First, by making it harder to deliver to a target any nuclear weapon that
is developed in violation of a zero-weapons regime, defenses would
reduce the anticipated strategic utility of such weapons, making
“breakout” less attractive and therefore presumably less likely.  Second,
even if defenses could at some point be surmounted, the existence of
relatively robust defensive networks around the world could, at the very
least, buy time in which the international community could rally to
develop or implement other means of responding to the threat.  As we
have seen with the world’s painfully slow responses to the ongoing threats
posed by the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs, the
international community does not always act decisively and swiftly.  It
could be valuable indeed to have a little more time before a violator
could fully realize strategic benefits from zero-option “breakout.”
Finally, I would like to say a word about another factor that we
have noted: the possibility that the potential availability of countervailing
reconstitution would need to be a part of deterring “breakout” from a
zero-weapons regime.  Already this possibility has been incorporated
explicitly into U.S. nuclear weapons planning as a way to provide a
“hedge” against a technical surprise or geopolitical risk.  As directed by
President Bush, and later codified in the Moscow Treaty, we are steadily
reducing our numbers of “operationally deployed strategic nuclear
weapons” toward the band of target numbers set by that agreement for
the year 2012.  At the same time, we are continuing with – and indeed
accelerating – our program for dismantling nuclear weapons.  We are
not yet, however, dismantling every single warhead that we remove
from “operationally-deployed” status.  For now, at least, we feel it
necessary to keep some warheads in existence, but in a non-deployed
status, in case some unanticipated unfavorable change should occur in
the strategic environment or a technical problem arise with any of our
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delivery systems or warheads that would render that portion of our
deterrent ineffective.
We are working, however, to make our “hedge” of non-deployed
“weapons-in-being” less necessary – and thus to permit further
reductions in our total stockpile of warheads.  This is a slow and
expensive process, but the “Complex 2030” program of the U.S.
National Nuclear Security Administration is designed to shrink and
modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure in such a way that we
would feel more secure in the future without maintaining today’s
numbers of non-deployed weapons. In short, we anticipate that a smaller
but more responsive infrastructure will enable us to manage the
geopolitical and technical risks associated with a smaller nuclear force,
thus making that smaller force feasible.  The possibility of countervailing
reconstitution, in other words, is already promoting disarmament
because it is helping us move toward a posture in which we can reduce
the number of nuclear warheads in existence as we feel less need to
maintain weapons-in-being as a “hedge” against unforeseen changes in
the strategic threat environment or technical surprise.
These issues will, of course, require much more study, but I believe
we should not ignore the possibility that this principle might be applied
in order to help current nuclear weapons states reach “zero” and to
deter “breakout” in a zero-option world.  In other words, every current
nuclear-weapon state’s strategic “hedge” ultimately could move entirely
into productive capacity.  This could make nuclear disarmament seem
less potentially threatening to them, thereby helping to achieve the
elimination of nuclear weapons.   It also could help sustain a zero-option
regime by confronting a would-be violator with the unpleasant prospect
that if it broke the rules by trying to develop nuclear weapons, it would
quickly be confronted by countervailing arsenals.
This is not a principle that could safely be generalized, of course,
any more than I think the universal availability of fissile-material
production capabilities in today’s world could safely be contemplated
alongside meaningful nonproliferation assurances.  Strategies that
manage risk through a responsive production base rather than weapons-
in-being, however, might offer friends of disarmament a way to respond
to the challenge of keeping a zero-option regime alive in the face of the
proliferation incentives that such a regime would itself help to increase.
It is, at any rate, food for thought.
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Having offered these suggestions let me wrap up by sharing a more
personal thought.  I have with me today a very kind gift that I received
last April from the mayor of the city of Hiroshima.  It is a small tapestry
depicting the Atomic Bomb Dome, a World Heritage Site that now forms
the centerpiece of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and lies near the
cenotaph of the victims of the atomic bombings of August 1945.  I have
carefully kept this gift, and I brought it with me on this trip, because it
helps keep me focused upon two important points.  Most obviously, it is
a sobering reminder from the past for disarmament advocates,
nonproliferation experts, and deterrence strategists alike.
But I also keep this tapestry because the costly closing act of the
long and ugly saga of the Second World War reminds me of how rooted
disarmament issues necessarily are in the broader context of international
tension and conflict – and of how important it is that we address
disarmament issues with the thoughtfulness that they deserve in all the
complexities of this context.  This piece of cloth thus has been valuable
to me not only as a warning but also as a source of inspiration and hope
that our collective wisdom will prove equal to the task.
I have tried today to sketch out some ways in which it might be
possible to help answer the questions that must be addressed if we are
serious about trying to move toward a disarmed world.  I do not expect
that everyone will necessarily agree with these ideas.  But I hope that
there is no disagreement on the importance of addressing, as clearly and
realistically as we can the challenges that would be entailed in achieving
and sustaining the elimination of nuclear weapons in our decidedly
complicated world.
There could hardly be a more appropriate place to rededicate
ourselves to this goal than here in Nagasaki.
